This is a final post in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives.

I am indebted to researcher Brian Sims for access to the report.

For earlier postings on I.S.9 history, see “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” “I.S.9 History—Air Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Sea Borne Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 1,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 2, “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 3,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 4,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 5,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 6.”

After the I.S.9 history’s lengthy chapters on operations in Italy, it offers chapters on operations in Yugoslavia, Greece, Austria, Albania, the Balkans (Bulgaria and Roumania, and Central Europe (Hungary and Slovokia).

The history also includes chapters on preventative training, I.S.9 newsletters, and a short section entitled “THE RESULTS AND THE COST.”

Concerning “the cost,” the report states:

“We make no attempt to assess the cost in terms of money. To do so we should require to know the answer to ‘What is the monetary value of human life and the cost of human suffering?’.

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This post is twelfth in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Access to this report is courtesy of researcher Brian Sims.

For earlier postings on I.S.9 history, see “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” “I.S.9 History—Air Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Sea Borne Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 1,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 2, “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 3,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 4,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 5.”

Here is a transcript of Part 6 of the I.S.9 history’s report on operations in Italy:

Part Six—Conclusion.

Before we leave Operations ITALY, it would be as well, perhaps to write somewhat briefly on one or two of our rather longer range operations and activities.

“Committee of National Liberation” (C.L.N.A.I.) – MILAN [Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italia].

Late in 1943, reports began to reach us of fairly large numbers of ex-P/Ws crossing into SWITZERLAND from NORTHERN ITALY. It was thought that the Committee of National Liberation [Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale], whose headquarters were in MILAN, were giving help to those ex-P/Ws.

With a view to further encouraging such help and with a view, also, to encouraging the flow of ex-P/Ws to SWITZERLAND by another means, an Italian officer (BALDO) volunteered to be infiltrated into NORTH ITALY, together with a W/T operator, with the intention of making his headquarters at MILAN.

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This post is eleventh in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Access to this report is courtesy of researcher Brian Sims.

For earlier postings on I.S.9 history, see “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” “I.S.9 History—Air Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Sea Borne Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 1,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 2, “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 3,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 4.”

Here is a transcript of Part 5 of the I.S.9 history’s report on operations in Italy:

Part Five—The Final Phase.

April 1st to the final capitulation of the German forces in Italy, 2 May 45.

At the beginning of April 1945, it was obvious that full preparations had been made to conduct an all-out attack finally to defeat the German forces in ITALY. The opening of the attack saw the 8th Army advance up to and through the ARGENTA gap and on to the River PO. 5th Army, after initial stiff resistance, swept through the APPENINES and onwards to VERONA. It was clear that the campaign had developed suddenly and more rapidly than had been anticipated and the enemy was already floundering in chaos. Throughout the NORTH, partizan bands had risen and were offering an additional threat to the German lines of communications, which already had been reduced to the minimum by the Allied Air Forces. It was anticipated that the enemy might attempt to make a stand on the ADIGE Line, but this was quickly turned and the way laid open to the BRENNER PASS and AUSTRIA and to VENICE, UDINE and TRIESTE. At this stage the American 92nd division pushed out columns into the NORTH WEST corner of ITALY and sealed off any escape routes the German 75th Army Corps had contemplated using, and by the end of April it was clear that the enemy would be reduced to complete submission within a matter of days. The final capitulation was signed on 2nd May 45, the enemy having been utterly defeated. Once the 8th Army was through the ARGENTA gap, and 5th Army had captured BOLOGNA, the Germans had been unable to offer any organized resistance.

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This post is eleventh in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives.

The chief task of I.S.9 was the support and rescue of escaped POWs and evaders (E&Es) stranded in enemy territory in Italy and elsewhere in Europe. I.S.9 was a division of M.I.9 (British Directorate of Military Intelligence Section 9), a department of the War Office during WW II.

Access to this report is courtesy of researcher Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” “I.S.9 History—Air Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Sea Borne Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 1,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 2, and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 3.”

Activities of Field Sections 1, 2, and 5, as well at the Boating Section, are described in this part of the report, and accounts of several named missions are given.

Of particular interest is an account of a Section 5 Lysander aircraft being downed by friendly fire while on a mission, and of the daring rescue of a wounded pilot who was stranded near the frontline by a small craft which landed on a makeshift dry riverbed runway.

The report also touches on I.S.9 (CMF) involvement in field activities in southern France.

The report contains a reference to the “several E & Es, including private soldiers, [who] were so highly thought of by the Italian patriots for their bravery, leadership and devotion to duty, that they were put in command of patriot battalions.” Canadian Pilot Officer John Leon Turner, Royal Canadian Air Force, who was chosen for captaincy of a band of partisans, is an example on this site.

Here is a transcript of Part 4 of the I.S.9 history’s report on operations in Italy:

Part Four—the Italian Winter Campaign,
from 1 Oct 44 until 31 Apr 45

1. General Military Situation.

2. Field Section Activities.

3. Special Operations (Land).

4. I.S.9 activities in the invasion of SOUTHERN FRANCE.

5. Operation “FERRET”.

1. GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION.

From 1st Oct 1944 and onwards through the Winter, and indeed even until the final battles of the Italian campaign, most of the activity in ITALY took place on the ADRIATIC coast, to which the 8th Army had been switched back in July and August 1944. It is doubtful if the Allies could ever have broken the German’s Winter line at CASSINO without the element of surprise achieved by the secret transfer of practically the whole of 8th Army from the ADRIATIC coast to the LIRI Valley in April 1944, so, too, the Allies might never have broken the GOTHIC LINE if Field Marshal ALEXANDER had not transferred the 8th Army back to the ADRIATIC coast in August. Due to the secrecy of this last move, which was carried out under cover of all ways and means of deception, KESSELRING discovered the Allied strength on the ADRIATIC coast too late, and the 8th Army pierced the EAST end of the German line. KESSELRING was forced to weaken his centre to prevent a disastrous break-through on the EAST coast.

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This post is tenth in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Research courtesy of Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” “I.S.9 History—Air Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Sea Borne Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 1,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 2.”

One of the more interesting bits of information in this installment of I.S.9 operations in Italy is news that the leadership of I.S.9 had almost no contact with the Rome Escape Organization, its companion POW assistance and rescue group that was in operation from the Vatican, until after the fall of Rome in June 1944.

Limited contact with the Rome organization during German occupation was made via I.S.9 couriers, but close communication and coordination was not feasible during German occupation.

Here is a transcript of Part 3 of the I.S.9 history’s report on operations in Italy:

Part Three—the Spring and Summer Campaigns 1944

1. The military situation at 1 May and onwards through the Summer of 1944.

2. Field Section Activities.

3. Field HQ.

4. Sea Evacuations.

5. Special Operations (Land)

6. Rome.

1. THE MILITARY SITUATION AT 1 MAY AND ONWARDS THROUGH THE SUMMER OF 1944.

At the end of the Winter 44, it was obvious that the enemy was re-grouping his forces and arranging his defence in order to delay the capture of ROME for as long as possible. They were still entrenched along the GUSTAV LINE which was heavily defended, particularly along the approaches to ROME – (MONTE CASSINO, MONTE CAIRO and the LIRI Valley).

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