This post is eleventh in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Access to this report is courtesy of researcher Brian Sims.

For earlier postings on I.S.9 history, see “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” “I.S.9 History—Air Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Sea Borne Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 1,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 2, “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 3,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 4.”

Here is a transcript of Part 5 of the I.S.9 history’s report on operations in Italy:

Part Five—The Final Phase.

April 1st to the final capitulation of the German forces in Italy, 2 May 45.

At the beginning of April 1945, it was obvious that full preparations had been made to conduct an all-out attack finally to defeat the German forces in ITALY. The opening of the attack saw the 8th Army advance up to and through the ARGENTA gap and on to the River PO. 5th Army, after initial stiff resistance, swept through the APPENINES and onwards to VERONA. It was clear that the campaign had developed suddenly and more rapidly than had been anticipated and the enemy was already floundering in chaos. Throughout the NORTH, partizan bands had risen and were offering an additional threat to the German lines of communications, which already had been reduced to the minimum by the Allied Air Forces. It was anticipated that the enemy might attempt to make a stand on the ADIGE Line, but this was quickly turned and the way laid open to the BRENNER PASS and AUSTRIA and to VENICE, UDINE and TRIESTE. At this stage the American 92nd division pushed out columns into the NORTH WEST corner of ITALY and sealed off any escape routes the German 75th Army Corps had contemplated using, and by the end of April it was clear that the enemy would be reduced to complete submission within a matter of days. The final capitulation was signed on 2nd May 45, the enemy having been utterly defeated. Once the 8th Army was through the ARGENTA gap, and 5th Army had captured BOLOGNA, the Germans had been unable to offer any organized resistance.

Continue reading →

This post is eleventh in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives.

The chief task of I.S.9 was the support and rescue of escaped POWs and evaders (E&Es) stranded in enemy territory in Italy and elsewhere in Europe. I.S.9 was a division of M.I.9 (British Directorate of Military Intelligence Section 9), a department of the War Office during WW II.

Access to this report is courtesy of researcher Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” “I.S.9 History—Air Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Sea Borne Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 1,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 2, and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 3.”

Activities of Field Sections 1, 2, and 5, as well at the Boating Section, are described in this part of the report, and accounts of several named missions are given.

Of particular interest is an account of a Section 5 Lysander aircraft being downed by friendly fire while on a mission, and of the daring rescue of a wounded pilot who was stranded near the frontline by a small craft which landed on a makeshift dry riverbed runway.

The report also touches on I.S.9 (CMF) involvement in field activities in southern France.

The report contains a reference to the “several E & Es, including private soldiers, [who] were so highly thought of by the Italian patriots for their bravery, leadership and devotion to duty, that they were put in command of patriot battalions.” Canadian Pilot Officer John Leon Turner, Royal Canadian Air Force, who was chosen for captaincy of a band of partisans, is an example on this site.

Here is a transcript of Part 4 of the I.S.9 history’s report on operations in Italy:

Part Four—the Italian Winter Campaign,
from 1 Oct 44 until 31 Apr 45

1. General Military Situation.

2. Field Section Activities.

3. Special Operations (Land).

4. I.S.9 activities in the invasion of SOUTHERN FRANCE.

5. Operation “FERRET”.

1. GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION.

From 1st Oct 1944 and onwards through the Winter, and indeed even until the final battles of the Italian campaign, most of the activity in ITALY took place on the ADRIATIC coast, to which the 8th Army had been switched back in July and August 1944. It is doubtful if the Allies could ever have broken the German’s Winter line at CASSINO without the element of surprise achieved by the secret transfer of practically the whole of 8th Army from the ADRIATIC coast to the LIRI Valley in April 1944, so, too, the Allies might never have broken the GOTHIC LINE if Field Marshal ALEXANDER had not transferred the 8th Army back to the ADRIATIC coast in August. Due to the secrecy of this last move, which was carried out under cover of all ways and means of deception, KESSELRING discovered the Allied strength on the ADRIATIC coast too late, and the 8th Army pierced the EAST end of the German line. KESSELRING was forced to weaken his centre to prevent a disastrous break-through on the EAST coast.

Continue reading →

This post is tenth in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Research courtesy of Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” “I.S.9 History—Air Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Sea Borne Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 1,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 2.”

One of the more interesting bits of information in this installment of I.S.9 operations in Italy is news that the leadership of I.S.9 had almost no contact with the Rome Escape Organization, its companion POW assistance and rescue group that was in operation from the Vatican, until after the fall of Rome in June 1944.

Limited contact with the Rome organization during German occupation was made via I.S.9 couriers, but close communication and coordination was not feasible during German occupation.

Here is a transcript of Part 3 of the I.S.9 history’s report on operations in Italy:

Part Three—the Spring and Summer Campaigns 1944

1. The military situation at 1 May and onwards through the Summer of 1944.

2. Field Section Activities.

3. Field HQ.

4. Sea Evacuations.

5. Special Operations (Land)

6. Rome.

1. THE MILITARY SITUATION AT 1 MAY AND ONWARDS THROUGH THE SUMMER OF 1944.

At the end of the Winter 44, it was obvious that the enemy was re-grouping his forces and arranging his defence in order to delay the capture of ROME for as long as possible. They were still entrenched along the GUSTAV LINE which was heavily defended, particularly along the approaches to ROME – (MONTE CASSINO, MONTE CAIRO and the LIRI Valley).

Continue reading →

This post is ninth in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Research courtesy of Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” “I.S.9 History—Air Operations,” “I.S.9 History—Sea Borne Operations,” and “I.S.9 History—Operations in Italy, Part 1.”

Lieutenant Ruggiero Cagnazzo is mentioned in this part of the history, referred to as Italian agent “CAG,” and the rescue of the “the Generals Party” is described in detail. The initial operational plan for this mission is described in a recent post, “Rescue Plan—Generals and Civilians.”

See also “Rescues along the Adriatic Coastline” I.S.9 rescue details.

Several prisoner accounts on this site mention prisoners’ awareness of the I.S.9 rescue operations.

For instance, a 1980 newspaper article on American serviceman Raymond E. Cox reported, “In the spring of 1944, American paratroopers dropped behind enemy lines and began assembling groups of escaped prisoners who were placed on PT boats and taken to larger ships waiting at sea. Cox missed out of a chance to get out of the country that way, however, and rode a borrowed bicycle to look up with a field army unit after the Poles began pushing the Germans up the Adriatic Coast of Italy and the ‘front’ shifted.”

Tom Ager, when traveling through the countryside near Florence with comrades, said, “Our idea then was to go to the east coast and try and get picked up, because we’d heard rumours that every now and then someone would arrive and pick up people—but how true it was I have absolutely no idea. But we never reached it—it was too heavily fortified.”

And Roland Rakow encountered a British commando while on the run who informed him of a rendezvous. Roland explained, “He had been dropped off behind the lines to contact POWs that they knew were circulating in the hills trying to get back to the Allied lines. He was letting us know that if they could, a boat would pick us up and take us back down the Adriatic and around the lines where the British and Germans were still fighting.” Although Roland narrowly missed a German Patrol along the way, he made it to the shore in time to be rescued.

Below is a transcript of Part 2 of the I.S.9 history’s report on operations in Italy:

Part Two

1. General.

2. The Boating Section, TERMOLI.

3. Field Section Activities.

4. Field Headquarters.

1. GENERAL.

From mid-Nov 43 both 5th and 8th Armies probed the outposts of the German Winter Line and built up their strength for two heavy attacks. 5th Army attacked the German defensive positions on the GARIGLIANO River, and around MONTE CASSINO, and 8th Army attacked and successfully crossed the SANGRO River on the ADRIATIC sector. However, due to the limited forces available and the dreadful Winter conditions, it was impossible to make further progress and these attacks were not exploited.

On January 22nd, 1944, a sea borne landing was made by the U.S. VI Corps at ANZIO behind the main German defence line. This seemed to be the only possible way of ending this stalemate and cause the Germans to withdraw during the Winter. The enemy was quick to sense danger and the four Allied divisions landed at ANZIO were soon opposed by ten enemy divisions commanded by the famous KESSELRING.

I.S.9 (CMF) had every desire to land a section at ANZIO but simply could not do so due to our limited W/E [war establishment] which still remained at the same strength as at 1 Nov 43. It is doubtful if very much could have been achieved, as the concentration of enemy around the ANZIO bridgehead made penetration look impossible. It is interesting to note that a mere handful of evaders ever crossed into the beachhead and a fairly large number were concentrated in the hills not far away. Every inch of the perimeter was thick with troops and mines. It was far better for us, therefore, to leave our sections to operate in areas which did have possibilities, for it was impossible to cover every sector of the front.

Continue reading →

This post is eighth in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Research courtesy of Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” “I.S.9 History—Air Operations,” and “I.S.9 History—Sea Borne Operations.”

Below is a transcript of a chapter in the history that begins to cover operations in Italy:

Operations in Italy (Introduction)

Part One

1. Events immediately prior to the invasion of SICILY on 9 June 1943.

2. The SICILIAN Campaign.

3. The invasion of the ITALIAN mainland, 3 Sept 43.

4. The military situation on 1 Nov 43.

5. The ITALIAN Armistice and general P/W situation in ITALY at 1 Nov 43.

6. Means available to tackle the problem.

1. EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE INVASION OF SICILY.

During the long campaigns fought in the M.E., the Western Desert and in NORTH AFRICA, active escape operations had proved themselves well worth while and a certain amount of experience had been gained. In GREECE and the islands it was possible to gain some idea of how far it was possible for an allied country, occupied by the enemy, to continue the struggle through partizan activities and thus offer some form of cover for the support of Allied clandestine organizations. With the fall of TUNISIA in the early summer of 1943, the whole of NORTH AFRICA was cleared of the enemy and everyone looked towards EUROPE. Events moved quickly and when it became known that SICILY was the target for initial assault we were immediately faced with fresh problems. Apart from our very limited resources in personnel and equipment capable of employment in the field with an invading army, we were faced with the problem of operating in an enemy occupied country.

Continue reading →

This post is seventh in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Research courtesy of Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,,” “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training,” and “I.S.9 History—Air Operations.”

Below is a transcript of the section of the history detailing rescue efforts and drop of stores and supplies into enemy occupied territory:

Sea Borne Operations

Subject to enemy defences and weather, sea borne operations for landing personnel are not normally very difficult.

The one great stumbling block to pinpoint landings and certainly to evacuation by sea, is pinpoint navigation. Normally vessels must operate during the non moon period and to arrive at a given time at a given pinpoint on a long stretch of coast without distinctive landmarks, is extremely difficult.

Native pilots of course are invaluable, but even these find it difficult to navigate on a dark night to one given pinpoint on a long straight stretch of coastline. Given the use of naval craft fitted with the latest radar, the problem is less difficult, but where schooners, fishing boats, etc., are used, pinpoint navigation is difficult. One answer, under these conditions, is the use of a homing beacon tuned to a radio compass fitted to the vessel to be used. This homing beacon means, of course, an extra piece of equipment with necessary batteries and aerial which must be carried by the shore party.

Continue reading →

This post is sixth in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Research courtesy of Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” “I.S.9 History—Communications,” and “I.S.9 History—Agent Choice and Training.”

Below is a transcript of the section of the history detailing rescue efforts and drop of stores and supplies into enemy occupied territory:

Air Operations

From the 1st November 1943, air operations in connection with the work of I.S.9 gradually assumed a more and more important phase of operations, until in the Winter of 1944/45, they became absolutely indispensible.

Air Operations fulfilled four functions for I.S.9; namely the infiltration of Agents and W/T sets [wireless telecommunications] to E.O.T. [enemy occupied territory], the dropping of stores and supplies to maintain those Missions so dropped, to clothe and equip E & Es found by the missions, and lastly the evacuation of E & Es [escapers and evaders] by D.C.3 and Lysander aircraft.

Connected with these operations were all the technical questions of the supply of equipment and stores for dropping and the packing of such stores.

Generally these stores were packed on I.S.9’s behalf by a central packing station known as M.E. 54 which packed for all Agencies at BRINDISI, but both at the commencement of I.S.9 Air Operations and at the end, where in both instances we virtually had our own private air force, I.S.9 was forced to do it’s own packing.

Continue reading →

This post is fifth in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Research courtesy of Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,”I.S.9 History—Methods,” and “I.S.9 History—Communications”

Below is a transcript of sections of the history detailing agent choice, training, and management:

Agents, Choice of

This paragraph must be sub-divided into (a) the choice of long term Agents, and (b) short term Agents, and again should be sub-divided into 2 periods, first that period of the early rush of activities when we really knew little or nothing of the “form” concerning Agents and a little later when it was quit obvious that our first ideas needed considerable change.

Therefore let us take (a) first.

The choice of agents during the period of our activities, when we were still in N. AFRICA and before the invasion of ITALY had taken place, was extremely limited. So difficult did it become after a few enquiries had been made that we were finally limited to the recruitment and use of Italian prisoners of war. The choice was further limited in view of the few recruits willing to undertake the risk of returning to ITALY and working for us. The absence of any large numbers of Italian P/W willing to return to ITALY can be well understood when it is stated that at that time there were extremely few (if any) Agents working in ITALY for clandestine organizations. The activities of the OVRA [Mussolini’s secret police] and other Fascist counter-espionage services made matters almost, if not quite impossible, for clandestine work.

Continue reading →

This post is fourth in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Research courtesy of Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization,” “I.S.9 History—Tasks,” and I.S.9 History—Methods.”

Below is the section on Communications from the history. I found the most surprising aspect of this chapter was the use of pigeons (“our feathered friends”) for communications.

Communications

This most essential part of any organization such as I.S.9 must be taken in two parts:-

(a) Inter communication between HQs [headquarters] and Sections.
(b) Clandestine communications by means of sets behind enemy lines.

To take (a) first.

The first 6-months or so of active rescue work in ITALY was made doubly difficult by reason of the lack of Communications between HQs and the Field Sections. It must be obvious to any reader that, at the best and under static conditions, Communications by means of Army Signals channels is uncertain and by no means rapid. This is due to no fault of the R.C.S. [Royal Corps of Signals], whose work during the Italian campaign has been magnificent, but due to circumstances generally beyond the control of any person.

It was unusual to find a Section very near to a higher Army Foundation where cypher personnel were available for “Top Secret” messages, or sufficiently near any formation happy to have an additional unit attached to it for Signals purposes.

Continue reading →

This post is third in a series drawn from a History of I.S.9 (CMF) in the British National Archives. Access to the document was courtesy of researcher Brian Sims.

See also “I.S.9 History—Organization” and “I.S.9 History—Tasks.”

Below is a transcript of a short chapter on methods from the history:

Methods

We could deal with this paragraph in the two words “All methods”.

That is just about the way of things, for we used land, sea and air for supply and evacuation. We used our own personnel, Partizans, Italian soldiers and sailors, and Allied Missions in E.O.T. I.S.9 (CMF) were not jealous and everybody and anybody who could help to aid or to evacuate evaders and escapers were used.

Under the headings or paragraphs that follow, more details of how we used these methods will, it is hoped, be gathered by the reader who cares to read this “History” to the end.

Help Given to I.S.9 Work by Others.

Friendly Natives.

It must be confessed at once that the organization of I.S.9 could not have functioned behind the enemy’s lines in ITALY or YUGOSLAVIA with any great measure of success had it not been for the tremendous help afforded to it’s personnel and to the E & Es by a friendly population.

It is true that throughout the whole campaign Fascists in ITALY and in certain areas in YUGOSLAVIA, the Ustachi, were at all times a danger likely to be encountered and often constituted a greater danger to clandestine work than did the Germans. In spite, however, of the activities of these parties the greater majority of natives, and in particular the small farmers, gave all possible help to clandestine operatives and to E & Es.

Continue reading →